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At the base of any plans providing for
reforming or modernizing the security sector
lies the analysis of internal and external
security threats to the country and its
citizens. If there is no clear vision of what
threats the country must defend itself
against, it is impossible to guarantee that
existing security institutions are structured
in the best way to counteract these threats.
As part of the “Public Awareness Campaign
on Security and Defense Policy” project, the
International Centre for Policy Studies
prepared a study called “Taking Stock:
Analysis of the Ukrainian security policy at
the end of 2006.” This document is an
attempt to evaluate the situation in
Ukraine’s security sector today. The main
goal of this study is to focus discussion on
issues that are not normally subject to
public debate. What are the biggest threats
to Ukraine’s security and how can the
country best deal with them? Why is reform
being delayed in the security sector? What
kinds of reforms are needed to make
Ukraine’s security sector more effective?
Internal and external security
threats
Recognizing the main threats to the
country’s national security is key to
implementing a well thought-out defense
policy. While foreign political risk factors play
their role in the debate around international
issues and determine Ukraine’s opportunities
for membership in international alliances,
internal risk factors can significantly affect
the success of reforms, including defense
reform, and the effectiveness of
implementing defense policy as a whole.
Among foreign political risk factors, the top
issues are: 
• foreign threats to domestic energy
security;
• worsening regional trends leading to the
escalation of conflicts close to Ukraine’s
borders (Transnistria); 
• international threats, including crossborder
crime, terrorism, WMD proliferation, and
illegal migration. 
Priority internal risk factors are:
• corruption in government bodies, including
in law enforcement bodies and their links
to the underworld on Ukrainian territory,
the absence of an effective judicial system,
and a generally ineffective and outdated
law enforcement system; 
• an ideological split among Ukrainian
voters, with the main role played by
diverging human values that are a
potential source of conflict between West
and East. 
• failure to identify Ukraine’s place in
various systems of collective security; an
Armed Forces whose equipment, machinery
and weapons are completely outdated,
effectively reducing the options for using
them and the Army’s battle readiness in
periods of conflict. 
The concept of security 
is changing around the world
After the end of the Cold War, there were
significant changes in the understanding of
security and defense. Instead of a
confrontation between two superpowers, the
world saw an increase in transnational
threats, such as terrorism, organized crime
and environmental disasters. This has
stimulated changes to how the entire
concept of security is perceived
internationally, with a shift from a
state-centric focus on national security or
state security towards a doctrine of “human
security,” which places more emphasis on
people.
ICPS specialists say that this is the security
context in which Ukraine must restructure
and reform its security sector. There is much
that Ukraine can learn and share with other
countries that have tried or are trying to
reform their security sectors to meet modern
demands. This refers to a body of policy and
practice known as “security sector reform”
(SSR) that has been developed by
international security policy-makers and
academics. 
Analysts distinguish four main areas of
reform in the security sector: 
• Strengthening democratic control over
security institutions by both the state and
civil society, including better policy
development and implementation and
better management of spending;
• Professionalizing security forces;
• Demilitarizing and peace-building,
particularly in post-conflict situations;
• Strengthening rule of law.
Security reform in Ukraine: 
Why it has failed
Ukraine’s security sector faces many
problems: ineffective operation, lack of
professionalism, lack of inter-agency
coordination, little respect for the law,
inconsistent standards of democratic
governance, and a post-authoritarian context
where security institutions frequently
identify their roles based on their own
interests rather than the interests of the
country’s citizens. These are all serious
problems, and Ukraine’s governments have
repeatedly stated their intention to deal with
these issues. However, reforms remain at the
incipient stage, far from the ideal of
coordinated security sector reform. There are
a number of reasons for this:
1. No clear understanding of key security
threats. Ukraine has yet to come up with an
adequate analysis of the major threats to its
security or to prioritize these threats
appropriately. Without a clear concept of the
main security threats, it is impossible to
consider whether the security sector is
countering these threats in the most
National security is one of the top priorities facing the Ukraine’s leadership 
and its solution often influences further social development. Energy problems,
the country’s ideological split, and the lack of money to modernize the Army—
these issues are often raised by the government and the media alike. However,
the debate rarely goes beyond the statement of facts. So far, Ukrainian society
has engaged in little serious dialog on security and the meaning of “threats”
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effective way, let alone to design a coherent
reform package for the purpose of
strengthening the sector’s capacity to
respond to such threats. Thus, until a
genuine attempt is made to develop a
National Security Concept that is truly
strategic, it will be impossible to develop
coherent SSR policy.
2. No inter-agency cooperation. The need
for inter-agency co-operation is not
appreciated enough within much of the
Ukrainian government, and even where it is,
the mechanisms to enable such co-operation
remain ineffective. There is still a strong
tendency for each ministry and agency to see
their role in isolation and to not consider
how their work affects or is affected by other
ministries. Information-sharing among
agencies is often very poor. Furthermore,
confusion in responsibilities and powers
means that, rather than working together,
ministries see themselves as in direct
competition with each other.
3. No political will. Little attempt has been
made to get the entire range of security
sector players to work together. This is a
signal that security sector reform has not
generally been backed by sufficient political
will. Although the goal of reform is regularly
name-checked by politicians of all stripes, in
practice they have not demonstrated the
political engagement and leadership needed
to push the process forward.
Democratic governance in
Ukraine’s security sector
Strengthening democratic oversight of
security institutions is crucial to the success
or failure of security sector reform. The
experience of Western governments suggests
that high levels of democratic control are not
just good for democracy, but also for the
security institutions themselves. The
separation of civilian oversight and
administrative management from operational
matters allows security services to
concentrate on their strengths.
Democratic control over the security sector is
a regular topic of discussion in political
circles and all of Ukraine’s Governments in
the last decade have committed themselves
to further improving the level of democratic
control. In recent years, activity in this area
has been livelier, as a number of events
confirm:
• The adoption of the Law on democratic
civilian control over military organization
and law-enforcement agencies; 
• The ratio of civilian to military personnel
in the Defense Ministry (MOD) is now
76:24; 
• The MOD has published its first White Paper
on defense and made a commitment to
updating the paper every year; 
• MOD has released a public report on its
activities which is available on the
internet; 
• Many security institutions have set up
offices open to the public and have
established community councils to ensure
ongoing contact with NGOs; 
• Together with NATO, there is a Joint
Working Group on a defense reform
program for the Professional Development
of civilian personnel; 
Despite these positive changes, Ukraine’s
security sector remains in the early phases of
transforming its security culture. The belief
that information must be kept secret is still
there, whereas a democratic approach
requires that information be disclosed, 
except for situations where there are clear
reasons not to do so, for the sake of national
security. The security sector is an area where
the public must be involved. Voters must
influence the policies developed and
implemented in this sector. One way or
another, it will be difficult for the public to
play any role or even to clearly formulate its
opinion on these matters, if ordinary
Ukrainians do not have access to the relevant
information. 
Although formal changes to organizational
and staffing structures to boost civilian
control are necessary, they cannot in
themselves ensure that the quality of
democratic oversight improves, since this
depends on the capacity of these institutions
and the skills of those that run them.
Building up competent civilian personnel 
and strengthening democratic oversight
procedures is a long-term process that
Ukraine has only recently begun.
The paper called “Taking Stock: Analysis of
the Ukrainian Security Policy at the End of
2006” was prepared by experts from the
International Centre for Policy Studies 
(ICPS), as part of the “Public Awareness
Campaign on Security and Defense Policy”
project implemented by ICPS with the 
support of the Royal Embassy of the
Netherlands in Ukraine and the NATO
Information and Documentation Center 
in Kyiv.
For additional information, contact ICPS
security specialist Viktor Chumak by
telephone at (380-44) 484-4400 or via
e-mail at vchumak@icps.kiev.ua.
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The approved version of the Law “On the Cabinet of Ministers of
Ukraine” is unlikely to reduce tensions in relations between the
Government and the President, says International Centre for Policy
Studies political analyst Ivan Presniakov. Instead, the rules by
which the President and Government will compete have become
even more controversial. The Secretariat of the President has
stated that the text of the Law as passed violates the current
Constitution in 11 provisions and the President intends to appeal
to the Constitutional Court with a demand that the Law or
individual provisions in it be declared unconstitutional.
Until the Constitutional Court hands down the necessary ruling—
which could take some time, given the Court’s current overload—,
the President, on one side, and the coalition and Government on
the other, will be governed by mutually exclusive legal norms. The
Cabinet of Ministers will follow the Law just passed, while the
President will follow his understanding of the Constitution, which
is the highest direct Law of the land.
This will have negative consequences for the functionality of the
entire political system in Ukraine. Whereas, earlier, the main
centers of power freely interpreted gaps in the Constitution to
their own benefit, the passing of the Law on the Cabinet of
Ministers raises the question whether there are really any
generally accepted, legitimate rules of the game based on which
the main institutions of power can interact.
According to the ICPS analyst, the competition between President
and Government could well go beyond the legal pale. If this
happens, “might makes right” will be the rule of the day. The
Government will ignore Presidential orders that counter the Law
on the Cabinet, while the President will ignore Cabinet resolutions
that counter his understanding of the Constitution. In practice,
decisions will be implemented in those instances where the
decision-maker has direct power over those who must carry out
the decision. Different interpretations of the way that candidates
for Minister of Foreign Affairs are nominated or deputy heads of
local administrations and deputy ministers are appointed,
different interpretations of how Ministers countersign legal acts
of the President and of the role of the National Security Council
could make the work of the government much more difficult and
even block it altogether. 
For additional information, contact expert Ivan Presniakov
by telephone at (380-44) 484-4400 or via e-mail at
ipresniakov@icps.kiev.ua.
New Law on Cabinet: “Might makes right” in Ukraine now
